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I 
INTRODUCTION 
The law regulates and sometimes prohibits activities that harm others. In 
addition, the law occasionally regulates or prohibits activities primarily because 
they create health and safety risks to the participants themselves. Such 
paternalistic regulations are readily justified when applied to children, adults who 
are mentally ill or cognitively limited, or those who are temporarily incapacitated 
(for example, due to intoxication). When applied to adults of sound mind, 
however, purely paternalistic laws can be challenged as an over reach of 
government, an imposition on individual autonomy and liberty.1 
Nonetheless, a variety of paternalistic laws are on the books.2 These laws 
regulate, tax, or prohibit risky activities. We are particularly interested in one of 
these risky activities, namely kidney donation by living donors. Although living 
kidney donation is a common medical procedure and donors usually enjoy a full 
recovery, the loss of a kidney poses long-term health risks, in particular that of 
renal failure should the donor’s remaining kidney fail.3 In the United States and 
most every other country (with the notable exception of Iran), kidney donation 
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 1.  JIM LEITZEL, REGULATING VICE: MISGUIDED PROHIBITIONS AND REALISTIC CONTROLS 18 
(2008); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 74 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978) (1859); Gerald Dworkin, 
Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE LAW 125 (Richard A. Wasserstrom ed., 1971).  
 2.  Common examples of laws considered paternalistic include legal requirements to wear seat belts 
and motorcycle helmets, and laws prohibiting the use of certain drugs. Dworkin, supra note 1, at 108–10. 
 3.  Umberto Maggiore et al., Long-Term Risks of Kidney Living Donation: Review and Position 
Paper by The ERA-EDTA DESCARTES Working Group, 32 NEPHROLOGY DIALYSIS 
TRANSPLANTATION 216, 218 (2017).  
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is permitted but financial compensation for donors is prohibited.4 Not only is 
there no legal market for kidneys, donors in the United States are often not even 
reimbursed for their full out-of-pocket costs.5 The ban on compensation may 
protect potential donors from the temptation of easing their financial situation 
by giving up a kidney, a choice they may regret in later years. 
At the same time, the need for transplantable kidneys is great, far exceeding 
current availability from deceased and living donations. The official waiting list 
of Americans with renal failure is now approximately 100,000, with a typical wait 
time of five years or more.6 Those on the waiting list are kept alive on dialysis, 
which is both costly to taxpayers (since Medicare pays for a large percentage of 
the costs7) and debilitating to the patients.8 Even with dialysis, thousands of renal-
failure patients die each year for want of a suitable kidney.9 The wait could be 
largely eliminated by easing the current ban on compensation for donors. An 
adequate supply of living donors would be especially valuable because living 
donors tend to provide higher quality kidneys with greater opportunity for 
developing a close tissue match, thus reducing the chance of rejection.10 Current 
estimates suggest that if compensation were permitted, the cost of payments for 
recruiting an adequate number of donors would be substantially less than the 
savings from reducing the number of renal patients on dialysis at government 
expense.11 
 
 4.  RANDOLPH T. BEARD ET AL., THE GLOBAL ORGAN SHORTAGE: ECONOMIC CAUSES, 
HUMAN CONSEQUENCES, POLICY RESPONSES 45 (2013). 
 5.  Although federal law permits reimbursement for the “expenses of travel, housing, and lost 
wages,” 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2012), neither Medicare nor most insurance policies pay these expenses. As a 
result, the majority of donors must pay out of pocket some portion of their donation-related expenses. 
D. R. Salomon et al., AST/ASTS Workshop on Increasing Organ Donation in the United States: Creating 
an “Arc of Change” From Removing Disincentives to Testing Incentives, 15 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 
1173, 1175 (2015). The average out-of-pocket cost to living donors in the United States is $5,000. James 
R. Rodrigue et al., The Decline in Living Kidney Donation in The United States: Random Variation or 
Cause For Concern?, 96 TRANSPLANTATION 767, 771 (2013).  
 6.  The Organ Procurement & Transplantation Network keeps a waiting list of candidates for 
kidney transplantation (including those who also need a pancreas), which included 98,272 distinct 
individuals when accessed on November 9, 2017. ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANTATION 
NETWORK, https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/data/view-data-reports/national-data/ [https://perma.cc/ 
LX4W-8CYP] (last visited Jan. 16, 2018). That count underestimates the need, since many renal patients 
who would benefit from a quick transplant are currently kept off the waiting list. K.C. Abbott & R.S. 
Gaston, Counseling Patients for Kidney Transplantation: Awkward Conversations?, 12 AM. J. 
TRANSPLANTATION 273, 273 (2012).  
 7.  Ron Shinkman, The Big Business of Dialysis Care, NEJM CATALYST (June 9, 2016), 
https://catalyst.nejm.org/the-big-business-of-dialysis-care/ [https://perma.cc/8849-ZCXH]. 
 8.  Herwig-Ulf Meier-Kriesche & Bruce Kaplan, Waiting Time on Dialysis as the Strongest 
Modifiable Risk Factor for Renal Transplant Outcomes, 74 TRANSPLANTATION 1377, 1379 (2002). 
 9.  Philip J. Cook & Kimberly Krawiec, A Primer on Kidney Transplantation: Anatomy of the 
Shortage, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2014, at 1, 1.  
 10.  Aloke K. Mandal et al., Does Cadaveric Donor Renal Transplantation Ever Provide Better 
Outcomes than Live-Donor Renal Transplantation?, 75 TRANSPLANTATION 494, 494 (2003). 
 11.  P.J. Held et al., A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Government Compensation of Kidney Donors, 16 
AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 877, 884 (2016).  
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Kidney donation is thus what is sometimes referred to as a “contested 
commodity” or “taboo trade.”12 Kidney donation is permitted only insofar as the 
profit motive has no part in the donors’ decision. To an extent, the ban on 
compensation for kidney donation is motivated by a paternalistic concern for the 
potential donors. People who opt to donate a kidney to save the life of a relative 
or friend, or out of pure altruism, are welcome in this scheme, but those who 
would donate primarily for the money are excluded. As it turns out, most kidneys 
are donated after death. In 2016, there were almost 10,000 deceased donors (with 
13,431 transplants) and 6,000 living donors (with 5,629 transplants).13 
This article contrasts the compensation ban on organ donation with the legal 
treatment of football and other violent sports where both acute and chronic 
injuries to participants are common. Although there is some debate about how 
best to regulate these sports to reduce the risks, there appears to be no debate 
about whether participants should be paid. For the best adult football players, 
college scholarships and multi-million-dollar professional contracts are possible. 
Indeed, the National Football League (NFL) is the highest grossing sports league 
in the world; the NFL collected $13 billion in revenue in 201614 and the thirty-two 
teams have a market value of anywhere from $1.6 billion to $4.8 billion.15 
Although the recent evidence on the long-term medical damage from concussion 
has caused widespread concern, there is no prominent voice calling for a ban on 
professional football. Indeed, the stakes are so high at this point that a ban is 
almost unthinkable in the foreseeable future.16  That observation illustrates how 
history, custom, and established interests have shaped the debate over regulating 
risky activity. 
It is nonetheless an interesting thought experiment to consider a principled 
position for regulating both violent sports and kidney donation—independent of 
history, the resulting array of stakeholders, and the sense of normalcy from long 
experience. Starting de novo, behind a veil of historical ignorance, where would 
logic take us? Our main conclusion is the form of an inequality, A > B; violent 
sports (A) are more problematic than kidney donation (B). The logical 
implications are twofold: first, if ethical concerns persuade thoughtful people that 
the right answer is to ban compensation for kidney donation, then the same logic 
would suggest that compensation should also be banned for participation in 
 
 12.  Kimberly D. Krawiec, Foreword: Show Me the Money: Making Markets in Forbidden Exchange, 
72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2009, at i, ii. 
 13.  ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ 
data/view-data-reports/national-data/# [https://perma.cc/753J-CQS6] (last visited Jan. 16, 2018). 
 14.   Id. 
 15.  FORBES, SPORTS MONEY: 2017 NFL VALUATIONS, https://www.forbes.com/nfl-valuations/list/ 
#tab:overall [https://perma.cc/2RH3-S2HF] (last visited Jan. 16, 2018).  
 16.  On the other hand, there appears to be the beginning of a grass roots movement to ban football 
for children. See, e.g., Lewis H. Margolis et al., Should School Boards Discontinue Support for High 
School Football?, 139 PEDIATRICS, no. 1, 2017, at 1, 1–6 (discussing three doctors’ reviews of the risks 
and ethics of high school football).  
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violent sports. Second, if the right answer is to permit compensation for 
participation in violent sports, then compensation for kidney donation should 
also be permitted. We see no logical basis for the current combination of banning 
compensation for kidney donors while allowing compensation for football 
players and boxers. 
We focus on the core argument for a ban on compensation for kidney 
donation, namely the paternalistic concern that even well-informed adults will 
sometimes be enticed by a financial reward to donate a kidney when in fact that 
is not in their true self-interest. In this view, the allure of money will overcome 
good sense, leading to exploitation and even coercion to which people with less 
income and education are particularly vulnerable. But the same concerns apply 
with still greater force to participation in violent sports. Whatever one concludes 
about the ethics of regulating risky choices and the problematic aspects of choices 
involving money and risk, the current circumstance—ban compensation for 
kidney donors, permit compensation for participation in violent sports—appears 
difficult to defend. 
II 
HISTORY AND LEGAL STATUS: ORGAN DONATION AND VIOLENT SPORTS 
A. Organ Donation 
With the notable exception of Iran, laws throughout the world prohibit 
markets in human organs.17 In the United States, the relevant law is the National 
Organ Transplant Act (NOTA), which prohibits the transfer of any human organ 
in exchange for “valuable consideration.”18 The term “valuable consideration” is 
not defined and its meaning is far from clear, but is generally assumed to include 
a wide range of monetary and in-kind payments that go beyond the 
reimbursement of reasonable expenses.19 
The original purpose of the statute was merely to establish a national organ 
procurement and distribution system.20 The valuable consideration language was 
added late in the legislative process in response to a Washington Post article 
about H. Barry Jacobs, a Virginia physician whose medical license had been 
revoked for Medicare fraud, who intended to establish a for-profit organ 
brokerage.21 Furthermore, careful reviews of NOTA’s legislative history suggest 
 
 17. Benjamin E. Hippen, Organ Sales and Moral Travails: Lessons from the Living Kidney Vendor 
Program in Iran, POL’Y ANALYSIS, no. 614, Mar. 20, 2008, at 1, 3–4 (discussing the Iranian system and 
its unique approach to compensated organ donation).  
 18.  National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 273–274e (2012). 
 19.  Kimberly D. Krawiec & Michael A. Rees, Reverse Transplant Tourism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., no. 3, 2014, at 145, 160.  
 20.  Id. at 159. 
 21.  Sally Satel et al., State Organ Donation Incentives Under the National Organ Transplant Act, 77 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2014 at 217, 226 (discussing the origination of NOTA’s ban on valuable 
compensation).  
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that Congress did not delve into the costs and benefits of a regulated system of 
compensated organ donation, whether such a system could be designed to protect 
donors and recipients, or what such a system might look like if it were to 
succeed.22 Instead, the historical record suggests that the ban against valuable 
consideration arose out of political expediency, and was unrelated to the statute’s 
main goal—the development of a national procurement and distribution 
system.23 
Organ donation is today so widely accepted that it is difficult to recall the 
skepticism with which it was first greeted by religious leaders, the general public, 
and (in the case of living donation, at least) the medical community. Deceased 
donation violates taboos about death and desecration of the human body, and 
many religious tenets are in tension with deceased organ donation.24 Moreover, 
the concept of brain death required a drastic rethinking of what it meant to be 
dead.25 Controversies over the definition of death continue to this day, as 
scientific and medical advances continue to shed new light on the human body 
and its operation.26 Given these hurdles, the high rates of deceased organ 
donation in many countries, including the United States, are an astonishing 
testament to transplant professionals’ success in transforming the once macabre 
act of deceased donation into a celebrated “gift of life.”27 
The ethical, moral, and practical controversies surrounding living donation 
are even more pronounced. Because living organ donors are healthy, living 
donation appears to violate a central tenet of medicine—primer non nocere, or 
first do no harm.28 Organ donation does harm to the donor. There are the 
immediate risks of the surgery itself, as well as potential long-term effects, with 
no corresponding physical benefits.29 The procedure is justified by the 
psychological benefits that accrue to the donor from helping another, usually a 
close family member.30 
Yet these psychic benefits pose their own ethical concerns. When a kidney is 
donated to an immediate family member, ethicists naturally worry that donors 
 
 22.  Krawiec & Rees, supra note 19, at 159–62. 
 23.  Id. at 162. 
 24.  See KIERAN HEALY, LAST BEST GIFTS: ALTRUISM AND THE MARKET FOR HUMAN BLOOD 
AND ORGANS 31–32 (2006) (discussing the difficulties deceased donation poses for various religious 
traditions). 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Richard J. Howard et al., History of Deceased Organ Donation, Transplantation, and Organ 
Procurement Organizations, 22 PROGRESS TRANSPLANTATION, no. 1, Mar. 2012, at 6, 10.  
 27.  HEALY, supra note 24, at 23–42 (detailing this transformation).  
 28.  NAT’L. ACADS. SCIS., ENG’G. & MED., ORGAN DONATION: OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION 263 
(James F. Childress & Catharyn T. Liverman eds., 2006).  
 29.  Id. at 268–70. 
 30.  E.g., THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, LIVING DONORS: PROCESS, OUTCOMES, 
AND ETHICAL QUESTIONS Part III.A (2006), https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcbe/background/ 
ginger_gruters.html [https://perma.cc/RH4P-B2JZ]. 
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may feel coerced or compelled to donate.31 Some ethicists have even gone so far 
as to question whether such a donation can ever be truly voluntary, given the 
emotional attachments involved.32 Organ donation to a stranger, very rare in 
practice, raises different concerns. As one leading ethicist put it: “The radical 
altruism that motivates a person to make a potentially life-threatening sacrifice 
for a stranger calls for careful scrutiny.”33 
In any event, although there remain some matters for concern, the bottom 
line is that both living and deceased kidney donation has become commonplace 
and widely accepted under the current regime. At this point, opening the door to 
donor compensation seems like a reasonable and urgent next step. 
B. Violent Sports 
1. Fighting Sports 
As is the case with organ donation, risky sports, such as boxing, mixed martial 
arts (MMA), and football, are so widely accepted today that it is difficult to 
imagine the once-precarious legal status of these endeavors. But at various points 
in history, both fighting sports and football were under serious threat of 
extinction, saved only through regulatory (or self-regulatory) changes designed 
to enhance safety, and public relations campaigns from well-placed advocates. 
Were it not for these interventions, each might well have gone the way of 
dueling—outlawed, as public opinion regarding the risk-benefit trade off 
evolved.34 
The law has always and inevitably had an uneasy relationship with violent 
sports, and that is particularly the case with boxing and other fighting sports. An 
activity whose principle object is the infliction of serious physical injury on 
participants is at odds with the criminal law of assault, which provides no general 
exemption for such consensual violence.35 Unlike other dangerous sports like 
football, absent disqualification or failure to appear, a boxing match is won only 
through the infliction of harm on an opponent.36 
 
 
 31.  Giuliano Testa, Ethical Issues Regarding Related and Nonrelated Living Organ Donors, 28 
WORLD J. SURGERY 1658, 1659 (2014). 
 32.  Id.  
 33.  Robert D. Truog, The Ethics of Organ Donation by Living Donors, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 444, 
445 (2005). 
 34.  Dueling, of course, served many functions beyond just sport, including dispute resolution, 
defending honor, and furthering political interests. See, e.g., STEPHEN BANKS, A POLITE EXCHANGE OF 
BULLETS: THE DUEL AND THE ENGLISH GENTLEMAN 1750–1850, at 234 (2010) (describing the purposes 
of dueling); BARBARA HOLLAND, GENTLEMEN’S BLOOD: A HISTORY OF DUELING FROM SWORDS AT 
DAWN TO PISTOLS AT DUSK 83 (2003) (explaining that Alexander Hamilton dueled Aaron Burr to 
preserve his political influence). 
 35.  Infra note 137 and accompanying text.  
 36.  See USA BOXING, NATIONAL RULEBOOK 19–21 (2017), https://www.teamusa.org/usa-
boxing/usa-boxing-national-rule-book [https://perma.cc/Q2AE-XMHA] (describing the methods by 
which a boxing match is won). 
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As a result, fighting sports have required an exception from the general 
criminal law to avoid the violation of statutes against assault and, in some cases, 
homicide.37 Over time, the law of consent developed exceptions for fighting 
sports, although the exact contours of that exception were often unclear and 
shifted over time. A classic articulation of the distinction comes from Foster’s 
Crown Law: 
Here is the appearance of combat, but it is in reality no more than a friendly exertion of 
strength and dexterity. They are manly diversions. They tend to give strength, skill and 
activity, and make fit people for [sic] defence . . . I would not be understood to speak of 
prize-fighting and public boxing matches, or any other exertions . . . of the like kind . . . 
which are exhibited for lucre, and can serve no valuable purpose; but on the contrary 
encourage a spirit of idleness and debauchery.38 
The difficulty for the common law, both in England and the United States, 
was how to distinguish permitted “manly diversions” from prohibited activities 
that served “no valuable purpose.”39 One mechanism at early common law was 
the attempt to distinguish legal sparring from illegal prize fighting.40 The 
distinction was simple enough in theory, and prize fighting was argued to pose a 
number of harms not posed by legitimate sports: (1) public disruption, stemming 
from disorderly fans, (2) gambling, and (3) injury to the participants.41 
Interestingly for our purposes, compensation, or the offering of a “prize,” was 
related to these dangers,42 creating a connection between compensation and 
illegality that closely parallels debates about compensated organ donation. As 
typified by the previously quoted Foster’s excerpt, the belief was that those 
fighting for money were not simply engaged in a demonstration of skill or seeking 
to build character or agility. Early cases, especially in England, thus sought to 
draw distinctions based on whether a reward, or prize money, was offered to the 
combatants,43 and whether the fighters used gloves, on the rationale that sparring 
with gloves was not inherently dangerous, despite the occasional death.44 Other 
important facts included whether the fight was held in private (legal sparring)45 
or in public (illegal prize fighting),46 and whether the fight was conducted 
pursuant to the Queensbury rules.47 But the cases were inconsistent, with some 
declaring illegal even fights waged with gloves,48 or conducted according to the 
 
 37.  See MARK JAMES, SPORTS LAW 148 (3d ed. 2017) (describing one exception to criminal law for 
boxing).  
 38.  Id. (quoting FOSTER, CROWN LAW (1762)).  
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. at 149.  
 41.  Ian Forman, Boxing in the Legal Arena, 3 SPORTS LAW. J. 75, 76 (1996). 
 42.  People v. Taylor, 56 N.W. 27, 28 (Mich. 1893). 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  R v. Young (1866) 10 Cox C.C. 371, 372.  
 45.  Id. 
 46.  R v. Orton (1878) 14 Cox C.C. 226, 228. See also R v. Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534, 534 (a bare 
knuckle fight in front of spectators who bet on the outcome was an illegal prize fight).  
 47.  R v. Roberts (unreported, 1901).  
 48.  Commonwealth v. McGovern, 75 S.W. 261, 264 (Ky. 1903); State v. Burnhum, 56 Vt. 445, 448 
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Queensbury rules,49 or conducted in a private gymnasium or club, or in which no 
prize was awarded.50 In any event, the continuing popularity of boxing made 
convictions difficult and enforcement inconsistent.51 In the 1920’s New York 
became the first state to legalize boxing, provided that it was supervised by a 
permanent state regulatory commission, a model still followed in a majority of 
states today.52 
Today, boxing’s popularity is being challenged by MMA.53 Although the 
violence of the sport initially led to controversy and public outcry, it also 
increased MMA’s visibility and popularity, turning what was intended to be a 
one-time event into a regular competition.54 One of the most vocal critics was 
Arizona senator John McCain, who called MMA “human cockfighting” and 
called for a complete ban.55 As a result, MMA was banned in forty states,56 
television networks refused to air it, and even pay-per-view became reluctant to 
televise events.57 As stated by one commentator: “[w]ith political bans and pay-
per-view revenue drying up, the UFC nearly became bankrupt and began looking 
to sell. MMA in America was essentially dead.”58 
In 2001, a group of investors, including boxing promoter Dana White, bought 
the UFC for $2 million and began working with state legislatures and regulatory 
bodies across the country to legalize MMA.59 That same year the state of New 
Jersey became the first state to adopt what eventually became the Mixed Martial 
Arts Uniform Rules of Conduct (the “Unified Rules”).60 The Unified Rules are 
comprehensive and cover all aspects of MMA fights, including scoring, round 
length, fighter attire, and fouls.61 Today MMA is legal and regulated in every U.S. 
 
(1884). 
 49.  E.g., State v. Olympic Club, 15 So. 190, 198 (La. 1894); Seville v. State, 30 N.E. 621, 624 (Ohio 
1892); In re Athletic Clubs, 5 Ohio Dec. 696, 696–97 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1896).  
 50.  Commonwealth v. Barrett, 108 Mass. 302, 303–04 (1871); Commonwealth v. Welsh, 73 Mass. 
324, 324, 327 (1856). 
 51.  Elmer M. Million, The Enforceability of Prize Fight Statutes, 27 KY. L.J. 152, 160 (1939). 
 52.  Forman, supra note 41, at 76–77. 
 53.  UFC vs Boxing: How UFC is Edging Ahead in the Popularity Stakes, SPORTS.BWIN.COM (June 
19, 2017), https://sports.bwin.com/en/news/infographics/ufc-vs-boxing-graphic,116485.html [https:// 
perma.cc/Q3X4-JPVR].  
 54.  Adam Hill, A Timeline of UFC Rules: From No-Holds-Barred to Highly Regulated, BLEACHER 
REP. (Apr. 24, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1614213-a-timeline-of-ufc-rules-from-no-holds-
barred-to-highly-regulated [https://perma.cc/E6BC-QZTF]. 
 55.  Reidar P. Lystad et al., The Epidemiology of Injuries in Mixed Martial Arts, 2 ORTHOPAEDIC J. 
SPORTS MED., no.1, 2014, at 1, 2.  
 56.   Id. 
 57.  Jordan T. Smith, Fighting for Regulation: Mixed Martial Arts Legislation in the United States, 58 
DRAKE L. REV. 617, 622 (2010). 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Lystad, supra note 55. 
 61.  UFC, UNIFIED RULES AND OTHER REGULATIONS OF THE UFC, http://www.ufc.com/ 
discover/sport/rules-and-regulations [https://perma.cc/E7HU-LQR2] (last visited Jan. 17, 2018). 
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state and is one of the fastest growing sports in America.62 
2. Football 
From the very start, the violence of American football contributed to its 
appeal while fueling public outrage. Newspapers of the era proclaimed the 
danger (and, thus, the excitement) of the sport. For example, the New York 
Times reported: “The present Rugby game of football as played in this country 
is a very risky pastime. . . carrying nearly the same risk that a soldier [assumes] 
on the battle field.”63 Said another article: “The bold students risk life and limb 
to gain football honors for their colleges.”64 Some colleges, most notably 
Harvard, banned football amid rising controversy.65 
At the same time that football had to fight elite college administrators and 
faculties for its existence, it also came under serious threat in a number of 
southern states. Ironically, given football’s popularity in the South and Midwest 
today, football was at that time still associated with elite Northern colleges, and 
thus many Southerners, particularly evangelicals, were skeptical of the sport.66 
Much like the Northern progressives who opposed football, Southern 
evangelicals also viewed sports such as prize fighting and football as venues for 
drinking and gambling, which incited immoral crowds, and distracted from 
colleges’ educational mission.67 In the wake of highly-publicized deaths, bills were 
introduced in a number of Southern state legislatures to outlaw football, 
including Georgia, whose governor ultimately vetoed the legislation.68 In other 
words, as was the case with fighting sports, resistance to football sprang from a 
number of sources, only some of which were related to the riskiness of the sport. 
Before gaining full acceptance, football faced a number of challenges, which 
were met with public relations campaigns and rules changes designed to increase 
safety (or the appearance of safety).69 The most celebrated of these challenges 
was the 1905 crisis, which prompted rule changes, the creation of the 
Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States (IAAUS, the precursor 
to the NCAA), and a famous intervention by Teddy Roosevelt.70 
 
 62.  Lydia DePillis, The Battle to Protect Fighters in the Fastest-Growing, Least-Regulated Sport in 
America, WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-battle-
to-protect-fighters-in-the-fastest-growing-least-regulated-sport-in-america/2016/04/22/b9484fe0-fc21-
11e5-886f-a037dba38301_story.html?utm_term=.8c6d7d567592 [https://perma.cc/YE4H-E4KY].  
 63.  Emily A. Harrison, The First Concussion Crisis: Head Injury and Evidence in Early American 
Football, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 822, 824 (quoting Change the Football Rules: The Rugby Game as 
Played Now is a Dangerous Pastime, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1893, at 2).  
 64.  Id. (quoting Ready for the Great Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1893, at 3). 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Christopher C. Meyers, “Unrelenting War on Football”: The Death of Richard Von Gammon 
and the Attempt to Ban Football in Georgia, 93 GA. HIST. Q. 388, 400 (2009). 
 67.  Id. at 398. 
 68.  Id. at 400–04. 
 69.  Harrison, supra note 63, at 824–25. 
 70.  See generally John S. Watterson, The Gridiron Crisis of 1905: Was it Really a Crisis?, 27 J. SPORT 
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In the end, football survived these early threats to its existence, not because 
it solved the safety issues, but because promoters and advocates succeeded in 
painting the virtues of football as exceeding the costs.71 Football, even at this early 
stage, brought real financial benefits to schools and teams.72 But more 
importantly, football played into a “culture of manliness” prevalent at the turn 
of the twentieth century.73 Risk taking, physical exertion, loyalty, and athletic skill 
were all a part of that cultural ideal.74 Meanwhile, periodic rule changes and 
improvements in safety equipment reduced the incidence of acute injuries and 
deaths on the field. 
III 
RISKS TO PARTICIPANTS  
Each year in the United States, 6,000 people donate a kidney, voluntarily 
assuming the medical risks attendant to surgery and living with just one kidney.75 
These risks have been quantified and will be documented below. Our interest is 
in comparing these risks with those stemming from participation in violent sports 
where there is no ban on inducements for participation at the highest level. 
Indeed, the average annual compensation for a player in the NFL is between $2 
and $3 million (depending on the team),76 with one player making over $50 
million this year.77 Injuries are common, and retired players are very often 
disabled by the long-term effects of these injuries as well the cumulative effect of 
thousands of blows to the body. Although it is difficult to quantify these effects 
in a way that provides a natural comparison with kidney donation, we provide 
some statistics that suggest that, for example, a man who signs a contract to play 
in the NFL for a year is consenting to be exposed to far greater medical risks than 
someone who volunteers to donate a kidney. 
This article focuses on football, because the epidemiology of injury and 
disability is better developed than for the fighting sports. It is worth noting, 
however, that there have long been concerns about the risk posed by fighting 
sports. That concern has accelerated in recent years, due to a better 
understanding of the long-term effects of head trauma. As a result of these risks, 
medical associations around the world have long called for limitations or bans on 
 
HIST. 291 (1981) (discussing the 1905 crisis).  
 71.  Harrison, supra note 63, at 828–29. 
 72.  Id.  
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. at 829.  
 75.  Cook & Krawiec, supra note 9, at 16. 
 76.   Average Annual Player Salary in The National Football League by Team in 2017/18 (in Million 
U.S. Dollars), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/675385/average-nfl-salary-by-team/ 
[https://perma.cc/R2YA-BYKR] (last visited Jan. 18, 2018). 
 77.  Players with the Highest Salaries* in the NFL in 2017 (in Million U.S. dollars), STATISTA, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/240098/players-with-the-highest-salary-in-the-national-football-
league/ [https://perma.cc/J452-EKZ5] (last visited Feb. 18, 2018).   
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boxing, including the American Medical Association and various state medical 
associations.78 The Australian Medical Association,79 Canadian Medical 
Association,80 and British Medical Association81 oppose fighting sports, including 
boxing and MMA, at both the professional and amateur level. Professional 
boxing is already banned in Sweden and Norway and there have been calls for 
bans in other countries.82 
Because MMA is a relatively new sport, the state of empirical research on the 
incidence of injuries is still less extensive than in more established sports like 
boxing. Yet, there has already been a strong response from the medical 
community against MMA. The American Medical Association,83 Canadian 
Medical Association,84 British Medical Association85 and Australian Medical 
Association86 have all called for a ban on MMA and for increased investment in 
research to assess the extent and frequency of injuries suffered in MMA fights. 
Despite the relative scarcity of empirical research, a recent systematic review of 
the epidemiology of MMA injuries concluded that MMA posed high injury 
rates—higher than most or, possibly, all other full contact combat sports—with 
patterns and frequency similar to professional boxing.87 
 
 78.  AM. MED. ASS’N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, 38TH INTERIM MEETING 371 
(Dec 2–5, 1984); Robert Glenn Morrison, Medical and Public Health Aspects of Boxing, 255 JAMA 2475, 
2579 (1986); Robert Trumbull, A.M.A., Citing Danger, Asks Abolition of Boxing, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 
1984), http://www.nytimes.com/1984/12/06/sports/ama-citing-danger-asks-abolition-of-boxing.html?page 
wanted=print [https://perma.cc/N6KM-K7HU].  
 79. AMA Position Statement, Combat Sport 2015, AUSTL. MED. ASS’N (Sept. 4, 2015), 
https://ama.com.au/system/tdf/documents/Combat_Sport_2015_AMA_Position_Statement.pdf?file=1&
type=node&id=42629 [https://perma.cc/F5GR-Y85N].  
 80.  CAN. MED. ASS’N, BOXING UPDATE (2001), available at http://policybase.cma.ca/dbtw-
wpd/PolicyPDF/PD01-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/68ER-K88R]; Canadian Medical Association Submission 
on Bill S-209, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (prize fights), CAN. MED. ASS’N (Apr. 15, 2013), 
https://www.cma.ca/Assets/assets-library/document/en/advocacy/BillS-209_en.pdf#search=combat%20 
sports [https://perma.cc/V3S5-T865]. 
 81.  Ban Ultimate Fighting as Well as Boxing, Says BMA, BRITISH MED. ASS’N (Sept. 5, 2007), 
https://web.bma.org.uk/pressrel.nsf/wlu/SGOY-76QEY8?OpenDocument [https://perma.cc/Y5LP-
ERW3] (“In a new report released today . . . the BMA extends its call for a complete ban on amateur 
and professional boxing to include mixed martial arts (MMA) competitions”); Fraser Ryan, British 
Medical Association Condemns Mixed Martial Arts, EDINBURG NAPIER NEWS (Nov. 20, 2013), 
https://edinburghnapiernews.com/2013/11/20/british-medical-association-condemns-mixed-martial-arts/ 
[https://perma.cc/B8VC-GJ66] (“A spokesperson for the British Medical Association said: ‘The BMA is 
opposed to mixed martial arts, cage fighting, and boxing.’”). 
 82.  Morrison, supra note 78, at 2479. 
 83. AM. MED. ASS’N, H-470.965 ULTIMATE AND EXTREME FIGHTING (2016), 
https://policysearch.ama-assn.org/policyfinder/detail/%20H-470.965%20ultimate%20and%20extreme 
%20fighting.%20sort%3A?uri=%2FAMADoc%2FHOD.xml-0-4281.xml [https://perma.cc/LX2L-
RGT8] (last visited Jan. 18, 2018) (“Our AMA: (1) opposes ultimate fighting and extreme fighting 
events; and (2) encourages states which have not banned these events to pass a law doing so.”). 
 84.  See supra note 80.  
 85.  Caroline White, Mixed Martial Arts and Boxing Should be Banned, Says BMA, 335 BRIT. MED. 
J. 469, 469 (2007).  
 86.  AUSTL. MED. ASS’N, supra note 79. 
 87.  Lystad, supra note 55, at 4. The authors urge caution in interpreting their results, due to possible 
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A. Kidney Donation 
The immediate risks attendant on the surgery can be briefly summarized. A 
systematic review and meta-analysis of the literature found that there were post-
operative complications in 7.3% of cases, which the authors deemed a “low 
complication rate.”88 Complications included wound infection (1.6%) and 
bleeding (1.0%).89 A questionnaire study of donors three months after their 
operation found that 18.5% of donors rated their overall health as “somewhat 
worse” and .4% rated their health as “much worse” than before, suggesting that 
over 80% had fully recovered in a subjective sense.90 The most serious outcome, 
death, is quite rare. Segev and colleagues, in a study of 80,347 donors over the 
period 1994–2009, determined that there had been twenty-five deaths, for a rate 
of 3.1/10,000 operations91—about twice as high as the annual chance of being 
killed in a motor vehicle accident for the most relevant age group (45–64) during 
that period.92 
Following recovery, donors typically do not suffer disability related to the loss 
of their remaining kidney, since one functioning kidney does everything required 
for normal functioning of the body. Segev and colleagues compared kidney 
donors with a sample of non-donors taken from one of the large longitudinal 
health surveys (NHANES III).93 The latter sample was matched on age and 
health status, which is important since donors are a relatively healthy group as a 
result of the selection process, and in the absence of donation would be expected 
to live longer and healthier lives than a representative cross-section of the U.S. 
population with the same age and sex distribution. The authors concluded that 
the “Long-term risk of death was no higher for live donors than for age- and 
comorbidity-matched NHANES III participants.”94 Similarly, an analysis of 3,368 
donors age fifty-five and over showed no difference in all-cause mortality in 
 
methodological differences in the way that injuries are calculated and recorded across sports. Id. at 8–9. 
Nonetheless, these differences arguably suggest that MMA is even more dangerous, as compared to other 
fighting sports, than the studies suggest. Id. at 4–6. 
 88.  Kirsten Kortram et al., Perioperative Events and Complications in Minimally Invasive Live 
Donor Nephrectomy: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 100 TRANSPLANTATION 2264, 2264 
(2016).  
 89.  Id. 
 90.  See Kossar Hosseini et al., Nephrectomy Complication is a Risk Factor of Clinically Meaningful 
Decrease in Health Utility among Living Kidney Donors, 20 VALUE HEALTH 1376, 1378 (2017) (stating 
that three months after surgery 18.5% of donors rated their overall health as “somewhat worse” and .4% 
rated their health as “much worse” than before the surgery).  
 91.  Dorry L. Segev et al., Perioperative Mortality and Long-Term Survival Following Live Kidney 
Donation, 303 JAMA 959, 960 (2010). 
 92.  See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, FATAL INJURY REPORTS, NATIONAL, 
REGIONAL AND STATE, 1981–2016, https://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/mortrate.html 
[https://perma.cc/9E8T-BTM6] (last visited Jan. 18, 2018) (showing that the traffic fatality rate in the 
United States during 1999–2009 for people aged 45–64 was 1.36/10,000).  
 93.  Segev et al., supra note 91, at 965. 
 94.  Id. at 959. 
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comparison with a matched sample from the Health in Retirement Survey.95 The 
only exception to this null conclusion is a study of Norwegian donors that found 
a divergence in the mortality rates after ten years, so that by twenty-five years 
18% of the donors had died, compared with 13% of the matched controls.96 A 
recent review article that included these studies and a handful of others confirms 
that there is no difference in death rates for at least the first ten years, and that 
the Norwegian study’s conclusion of divergence after that has not been 
replicated.97 
What about the particular threat for donors that their single kidney may fail, 
which in the absence of an immediate transplant would mean that they go on 
dialysis? The best study of donors in the United States found a higher cumulative 
incidence of failure and end stage renal disease (ESRD) for donors than 
nondonors—0.31% versus 0.04%.98 Although the risk is significantly elevated for 
donors, it remains very low in an absolute sense, representing an increased 
chance of about 1 in 400.99 
Finally, a questionnaire study of 2,455 donors who were between five and 
forty-eight years from their surgery found that 84% were satisfied with their 
lives.100 The likelihood of satisfaction was enhanced by the donors’ feeling that 
their gift had positive effects on their relationships.101 
It should be noted that the growing body of research on the medical and 
health consequences of kidney donation discussed in Section A is in part 
motivated by an interest in providing potential donors with the information they 
need in order to make a well-informed decision. In comparison, the 
epidemiological evidence on participation in violent sports is meager, and in any 
event few youths (or their parents) are exposed to a systematic account of the 
injuries and chronic disabilities entailed in a decision to pursue one of these sports 
as a career. 
B. Football 
One challenge in making a meaningful comparison between the risks entailed 
in kidney donation and the risks entailed in participation in contact sports is that 
the latter may stretch out for many years and involve not one choice (donate or 
not) but rather a series of choices regarding participation. In particular, the young 
 
 95.  P.P. Reese et al., Mortality and Cardiovascular Disease among Older Live Kidney Donors, 14 
AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1853, 1855 (2014). 
 96.  Geir Mjoen et al., Long-Term Risks for Kidney Donors, 86 KIDNEY INT. 162, 165 (2014).  
 97.  Ngan N. Lam et al., Long-Term Medical Risks to the Living Kidney Donor, 11 NATURE REVS. 
NEPHROLOGY 411, 414 (2015).  
 98.  Abimereki D. Muzaale et al., Risk of End-Stage Renal Disease Following Live Kidney Donation, 
311 JAMA 579, 580 (2014).   
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Emily E. Messersmith et al., Satisfaction with Life among Living Kidney Donors: A RELIVE 
Study of Long-Term Donor Outcomes, 98 TRANSPLANTATION 1294, 1298 (2014).   
 101.  Id. at 1295. 
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men who are drafted into the NFL each year have almost all played organized 
football for a number of years and have been exposed to the risk of injury 
throughout grade school, high school and college. Various comparisons of 
football with the single act of donation may be possible, such as playing in one 
game or playing for one season. But given that the emphasis of this article is on 
inducements, the analysis will focus on the risks associated with a professional 
career. If NOTA’s ban on inducements were applied to football, then the NFL, 
and the possibility of a post-collegiate career playing football, would presumably 
disappear. 
 The risks of an NFL career are illustrated by statistics on acute injuries during 
practices and games kept by each team. In addition, data are becoming available 
on the health status and causes of death for former players. What is not clear 
from the available epidemiology is how much of the disability observed in former 
pros is the result of their professional career, as opposed to injuries sustained 
playing in college, high school, and even before. To put the professional 
experience in context, then, a thorough analysis begins with injuries to youths. 
Rough physical contact is part of the game in football, and injuries are 
common from an early age. For boys less than twenty years old, football, among 
all sports and other types of recreational activities, is the most common cause of 
injury requiring a trip to the emergency department.102 An analysis of emergency 
room visits for 2001–2009 estimated there were 350,000 youths per year treated 
for football injuries.103 
Of these, 25,000 were treated for non-fatal traumatic brain injuries (TBI), 
typically concussion, of which over half (13,667) were males age 15–19.104 About 
1.5 million males in this age group played organized tackle football in 2009, and 
if we can assume that most of the injuries affected those rather than youths 
playing pick-up games, the treated TBI injury rate was close to 1%. The overall 
rate is thought to be much higher, since most concussions are not treated.105 
An alternative set of national estimates link concussion risk to game exposure 
for school football teams.106 The authors’ estimates suggest that over the course 
of a ten game season, a high school player would have a 1.55% chance of being 
 
 102.  Ctrs for Disease Control and Prevention, Nonfatal Traumatic Brain Injuries Related to Sports 
and Recreation Activities among Persons Aged <=19 Years — United States, 2001-2009, 60 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1337, 1341 (2011). 
 103.  Id. at 1340.   
 104.  Id. at 1341. 
 105.  Daniel H. Daneshvar et al., The Epidemiology of Sport-Related Concussion, 30 CLIN. SPORTS 
MED. 1, 3 (2011); see also Victor G. Coronado et al., Trends in Sports- and Recreation-Related Traumatic 
Brain Injuries Treated in US Emergency Departments: The National Electronic Injury Surveillance System 
– All Injury Program (NEISS-AIP) 2001-2012, 30 J. HEAD TRAUMA REHABIL. 185, 187 (2015) (updating 
some of the statistics through 2012); Blair J. Smart et al., Tackling Causes and Costs of ED Presentation 
for American Football Injuries: A Population-Level Study, 34 AMER. J. EMERGENCY MED. 1198, 1201 
(2016) (reporting that half of football injuries treated in an emergency department in 2010 and 2011 were 
orthopedic, including sprains and fractures).  
 106.  Daneshvar, supra note 105, at 3. 
COOK_KRAWIEC_PAGINATED (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/2018  10:50 AM 
No. 3 2018] FOOTBALL PLAYERS AND KIDNEY DONORS 23 
 
concussed, and a college player a 3.0% chance.107 These statistics are somewhat 
out of date, and there has been a strong upward trend in reported concussions in 
organized football, in part due to the national “Heads Up” campaign initiated by 
the Centers for Disease Control in 2004, increased media attention, and the 
passage of youth sports concussion laws in all fifty states.108 These laws specify 
that young players with possible concussions must be removed from the game 
and cleared for return by a set protocol.109 
About 1.5% of college players are ultimately drafted into the NFL,110 and for 
those professional players more precise information is available on acute injury 
rates. A recent report by the Harvard Law School found that in 2015, the 2,251 
active players in the NFL experienced 2066 injuries during the preseason and 
regular season, where “injury” is defined as an event recorded by the team trainer 
that would typically require time lost from practice or game.111 Of these injuries, 
272 were concussions, which works out to .071 concussions per player-season. At 
7.1%,112 this is over twice the rate for college players, and about equal to the rate 
of surgical complications in kidney donation.113 
A recent study of “life after football” brings together the official injury 
reports and survey information to paint a grim picture. The authors report that 
93% of former players missed at least one game due to injury, and half had three 
or more major injuries, often requiring surgery.114 For a substantial majority, 
injuries ended their career or contributed to the decision to end their career.115 
Nine of ten former players have nagging aches and pains from football when they 
wake up, and for most the pain lasts all day.116 For those ages 30–49, the ability to 
work is impaired by injury.117 
 
 107.  Id. at 5. 
 108.  Coronado, supra note 105, at 191. 
 109.  See, e.g., Sports Concussion Policies and Laws, CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION (Feb. 16, 2015), https://www.cdc.gov/headsup/policy/index.html [https://perma.cc/6VY4-
PCMX] (providing an overview of the state concussion laws).  
 110.  Estimated Probability of Competing in Professional Athletics, NCAA (Mar. 10, 2017), 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/estimated-probability-competing-professional-athletics 
[https://perma.cc/8Q5F-DW8X]. 
 111.  CHRISTOPHER R. DEUBERT ET AL., PROTECTING AND PROMOTING THE HEALTH OF NFL 
PLAYERS: LEGAL AND ETHICAL ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 62–65 (2016), https://football 
playershealth.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/01_Full_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YY3-
ST44].  
 112.  Id. at 64.  
 113.  Kortram, supra note 88. 
 114.  Id. at 106. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. But see Everett J. Lehman et al., Suicide Mortality among Retired National Football League 
Players Who Played 5 or More Seasons, 44 AM. J. SPORTS MED. 2486, 2488 (2016) (finding that NFL 
players who play at least five years before retirement have a lower death rate, including a lower suicide 
rate, than the population at large). In response, it should be noted that NFL players as a group are more 
highly educated than average, and are extraordinary physical specimens, so that the national average is 
not an apt comparison if the goal is to determine how their football careers affected their mortality rate.   
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But what has garnered considerable attention and concern is the fact that a 
high percentage of former players have chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE) 
by the time they die. CTE is a progressive neurodegeneration associated with 
repetitive head trauma, with a variety of symptoms: impulsivity, depression, 
apathy, anxiety, explosivity, episodic memory loss, and attention and executive 
function problems.118 A recent postmortem study of a sample of donated brains 
of former NFL players found that 110 of 111 indicated either mild or (more 
commonly) severe CTE.119 Interviews with family members found that behavior, 
mood, and cognitive symptoms were common among this group.120 
These findings do not imply that 99% of former NFL players will have CTE. 
The brains in this study were voluntarily submitted for examination by family 
members who were often motivated by a desire to know the cause of their loved 
ones dementia or other neurological problems, which is to say, the brains of those 
who died without such problems may be largely missing from the sample. But the 
111 brains do represent 8.5% of the 1300 former NFL players who died during 
the period that these brains were donated.121 That places something of a logical 
lower bound on the prevalence of CTE. Presumably the true prevalence is much 
higher than 8.5%. 
The other problem with these remarkable findings is that they do not provide 
a direct indication of the cause or causes of the CTE and associated disabilities. 
Repetitive head trauma is recognized as a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for CTE.122 The subjects had been exposed to repetitive head trauma throughout 
their careers as football players, which typically would have started in high school 
or well before. In fact, there is some evidence that age at first exposure to football 
may be related to the likelihood of impaired cognitive performance by former 
football players.123 Elite players who choose to go professional following college 
likely increase their chances of neurological problems in later life, which are 
already high because of their exposure up until that point. Unfortunately, the 
science does not provide a basis for sorting out the additional contribution of an 
NFL career to this health burden. 
Although it is not possible to do a precise apples to apples comparison of the 
medical risks associated with kidney donation and the risks associated with a 
professional football career, it seems clear that the acute risk of injury and of 
 
 118.  Jesse Mez et al., Clinicopathological Evaluation of Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in 
Players of American Football, 318 JAMA 360, 361 (2017).  
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. at 362. 
 121.  Joe Ward et al., 110 N.F.L. Brains, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/07/25/sports/football/nfl-cte.html [https://perma.cc/9AJ7-
DU3G]. 
 122.  Christine M. Baugh et al., Current Understanding of Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy, 16 
CURR. TREAT. OPTIONS NEUROL., no. 9, 2014, at 1, 6. 
 123.  Julie M. Stamm et al., Age of First Exposure to Football and Later Life Cognitive Impairment in 
Former NFL Players, 84 NEUROLOGY 1114, 1115 (2015).  
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long-term disability are far higher for the football player. As discussed above, 
most NFL veterans live out their lives following retirement with serious physical 
and mental disabilities. The vast majority of kidney donors lead entirely normal 
lives following recovery from the initial operation. 
The thought experiment here can be motivated by imagining a blank slate in 
regulating kidney donation and football, where the question is whether 
inducements should be allowed for either. If the discussion focused solely on the 
severity of risk of serious injury and disability, allowing substantial inducements 
for kidney donation is a more attractive proposition. The additional donors who 
are recruited by the inducement would have a small probability of death from the 
operation and a slightly elevated chance of kidney failure. In contrast, 
inducement to play professional football comes loaded with a large chance of 
orthopedic problems and mental disability in later life. 
IV 
THE LIMITS OF CONSENT 
A. Living Kidney Donation as a Risky Choice 
Whether and when competent, sober, well-informed, adults should be banned 
by government authority from choosing to engage in an activity that risks their 
own life and limb is an ancient point of contention.124 There are a variety of 
hazardous activities that are permitted with no legal bar to receiving 
compensation.125 Included on this list are such occupations as logging, roofing, 
commercial fishing, and military service.126 Also included are violent sports such 
as football, boxing, and mixed martial arts (MMA). These examples illustrate a 
broad endorsement of the principle that consenting adults should be allowed to 
exchange (in a probabilistic sense) their physical health and safety for financial 
compensation, even in some instances where the ultimate product is simply 
providing a public entertainment. 
One potentially distinguishing feature of kidney donation is that the harm is 
not the result of an accident, but rather of the deliberate action (of the surgeon 
and medical team). In that sense, kidney donation may be usefully related to 
other voluntary medical procedures that carry some risk. Here is a partial list, 
categorized by legal status: 
• Permitted and commonly compensated: donate eggs, sperm, or blood 
plasma; participate in medical experiments; serve as a surrogate 
 
 124.  See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 30 (1963) (discussing paternalism and 
the enforcement of morality); LEITZEL, supra note 1, at 119 (discussing the role of paternalism in drug 
law); MILL, supra note 1, at 74 (discussing the role of societal authority over individuals); MICHAEL J. 
TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 147–63 (1993) (discussing the role of 
paternalism in the context of contracts). 
 125.  W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life: Estimates with Risks by Occupation and Industry, 42 ECON. 
INQUIRY 29, 33 (2004). 
 126.   Id. 
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mother (in some states). 
• Permitted but do not involve compensation: sex change operation, 
cosmetic surgery 
• Permitted but payment is banned: donation of a kidney, liver, whole 
blood for transfusion,127 or bone marrow (depending on extraction 
method and jurisdiction).128 
It would be difficult to find a principled basis that would rationalize this 
pattern in legal status. Still, the public debate is, to some extent, informed by 
common themes, and a belief that the law should reflect a consistent application 
of relevant principles. Among the relevant themes are freedom from 
unwarranted government interference, respect for individual preferences and 
choices, and a concern for the interpersonal and societal effects of individual 
choices.129 
B. The Harm Principle and External Effects of Risky Choices 
In the search for a principled basis for setting legal boundaries on self-
hazardous choices, a natural starting point is the tenet that adult choices that do 
not hurt others should be allowed by government. This Harm Principle was 
developed by JS Mill in his classic treatise On Liberty (1859).130 It provides a 
rationale for the view that adults in the possession of their faculties should be free 
to choose to engage in risky activities if that choice does not harm others who are 
not part of the bargain.131 
JS Mill was a prominent adherent to the utilitarian school of philosophical 
thought, which defines the public good as the sum of individual utilities and 
endorses the view that rational individuals are best positioned to make the 
choices that will further their own interests. In other words, adults in possession 
of their full faculties are in the best position to construct their own lives, and, in 
particular, decide whether and when to engage in risky activities. In this view, 
paternalistic regulations—those imposed for the individual’s own good—should 
 
 127.  Although NOTA does not address blood products, FDA labeling regulations require that whole 
blood for transfusion be labeled as “paid” if the donor received compensation and, as a practical matter, 
whole blood for transfusion in the United States is procured on an almost entirely voluntary basis. 21 
C.F.R. § 606.121 (2018). 
 128.  But see Flynn v. Holder, 684 F.3d 852, 862 (2012) (holding that NOTA does not ban bone 
marrow extracted through apheresis).  
 129.  See, e.g., T. Randolph Beard & Jim Leitzel, Designing a Compensated-Kidney Donation System, 
77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2014, at 253, 255–58; Alexander M. Capron, Six Decades of Organ 
Donation and the Challenges that Shifting the United States to a Market System Would Create Around the 
World, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2014 at 25, 61 (discussing the possible societal impacts of 
allowing payment for organs); I. Glenn Cohen, Regulating the Organ Market: Normative Foundations for 
Market Regulation, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2014, at 71, 27 (2014) (discussing the protection 
of individuals). 
 130.  MILL, supra note 1, at 9.  
 131.  Id. While Mill derives an argument for liberty from government interference by utilitarian logic, 
other philosophers have asserted a direct claim based on individual autonomy. See, e.g., ISAIAH BERLIN, 
TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY 16 (1958); Dworkin, supra note 1, at 112.  
COOK_KRAWIEC_PAGINATED (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/2018  10:50 AM 
No. 3 2018] FOOTBALL PLAYERS AND KIDNEY DONORS 27 
 
be limited to restrictions on children or on adults who are not in a position to 
make free and in some sense well-informed choices.132 A slightly different version 
of this argument is to assert that, although everyone makes poor choices at times, 
the typical (sane and sober) adult is better able to make choices that further his 
or her own interests than is a legislature or government regulatory agency. This 
claim has implicitly been challenged by the development of behavioral economics 
over the last half century, with its extensive documentation of the systematic 
errors to which adults are prone when making complex decisions.133 We return to 
that challenge in Section C. 
Although the Harm Principle appears to create a broad scope for individual 
autonomy, that is only true under specified limits on the kinds of external effects 
that are considered problematic. Most individuals are enmeshed in a web of 
sentiment and responsibility to family members, neighbors, co-workers and 
others, so that a risky choice that results in injury or death will tend to have 
harmful consequences for other people, including those who had no direct 
authority or influence over that choice. Furthermore, third-party effects are 
created by participation in private and government insurance programs and 
eligibility for safety net programs where any financial costs (for medical care, for 
example) are broadly shared.134 
In any event, in the case of living kidney donation, the direct external effects 
include considerable surplus of benefit over cost, in the sense that enhancing the 
quality and quantity of kidneys available for transplantation would reduce 
disability and save lives among patients, while saving the cost (to taxpayers) of 
maintaining these patients on dialysis.135 Hence for kidney donation, unlike 
dueling or boxing (or a great variety of other risky activities), it appears that the 
external effects are far more positive than negative. 
A concern with effects on society and culture also play an important role in 
the treatment of consensual violence, both pro and con. The criminal law relating 
to interpersonal violence generally rests on the legal myth that assaults disrupt 
the public order and are crimes against the State.136 In principle, then, the 
question of whether the actual victim had consented is not relevant to 
establishing the guilt of the assailant. If two people agree to settle their 
 
 132.  LEITZEL, supra note 1, at 21–27.  
 133.  See generally DANIEL KAHNEMANN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2011) (describing the 
thinking processes of adults); Richard H. Thaler, Prize Lecture: From Cashews to Nudges: The Evolution 
of Behavioral Economics, NOBELPRIZE.ORG (Dec. 8, 2017), http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/ 
economic-sciences/laureates/2017/thaler-lecture.html [https://perma.cc/C7TR-33FH]. 
 134.  Id. at 28 (quoting MILL, supra note 1, at 79) (“I fully admit that the mischief which a person does 
to himself may seriously affect, both through their sympathies and their interests, those nearly connected 
with him and, in a minor degree, society at large.”).  
 135.  Held et al., supra note 11, at 883. 
 136.  MICHELLE M. DEMPSEY, PROSECUTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 
185–210 (200); Vera Bergelson, The Right to be Hurt – Testing the Boundaries of Consent, 75 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 165, 172–73 (2003); Alon Harel, Why Only the State May Inflict Criminal Sanctions, 14 LEGAL 
THEORY 113, 120 (2008). 
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differences with a fistfight, they may both be prosecuted for assault and battery.137 
More serious consensual violence, dueling with guns or edged weapons, has long 
been outlawed. Yet in other circumstances, consent transforms interpersonal 
violence into an acceptable or even virtuous activity, as in the case of surgery or 
sports.138 An operation to remove a kidney for transplant following the donor’s 
consent is of course not a criminal act, but rather (now considered) a virtuous one 
for both the surgeon and the donor. A boxer who knocks out his opponent 
(causing concussion), or a linebacker who sacks the quarterback with a crushing 
tackle, are cheered by their fans and team mates. In these cases, the violence is 
exempt from criminal liability, usually by statute but in any event by common 
practice. 
The treatment of consensual violence in sports may be challenged from both 
sides.  Libertarians under the influence of the Harm Principle may question why 
the carve out in the criminal law is limited to activities that could be construed as 
sports and does not extend to voluntary fights up to and including duels. Those 
with a more paternal view will take the contrary position, suggesting that boxing 
should be given the same criminal status as a barroom brawl. What are the special 
virtues of football, boxing, or other violent sports that balance against the 
foreseeable harms in the form of injuries to participants? 
The principled distinction between criminal assault when the participants 
have consented, and the legal violence inherent in some sports, can be argued in 
various ways. For one thing, the violence in organized sports is regulated by the 
rules that are intended to limit the potential for serious injury. That argument 
may be tested against the increasing evidence regarding acute and chronic injury 
suffered by professional athletes, as previously summarized. A second line of 
argument is that these sports inculcate manly virtues that are otherwise in short 
supply. University of Michigan football coach Jim Harbaugh opined that football 
is “the last bastion of hope for toughness in America in men.”139 A more cynical 
view is that the “virtue” is not so much to the players as to the fans, whose 
enjoyment of the game supports an industry at the college and professional level 
worth many billions of dollars. 
 
 137.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2016).  The Model Penal Code states that the 
victim’s consent to bodily injury is a defense “when conduct is charged to constitute an offense because 
it causes or threatens bodily injury, consent to such conduct or to the infliction of such injury is a defense 
if: (a) the bodily injury consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to is not serious; or (b) the 
conduct and the injury are reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a lawful athletic 
contest or competitive sport or other concerted activity not forbidden by law.”). The MPC also 
distinguishes simple assault—purposely, knowingly or recklessly caused bodily injury, to which the 
defense of consent might be applied, or become a mitigating factor—from aggravated assault—
purposely, knowingly or recklessly caused serious bodily injury under circumstances manifesting extreme 
indifference to human life. Id.  
 138.  Bergelson, supra note 136, at 172–73; see also Heidi Hurd, Was The Frog Prince Sexually 
Molested?: A Review of Peter Westen’s The Logic Of Consent, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1329, 1329 (2005). 
 139.  Angelique S. Chengelis, HBO Piece Reveals Harbaugh’s Burning Will to Win, DETROIT NEWS 
(Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/sports/2015/04/19/hbo-jim-harbaugh-reveals-um-
love-real-sports/26042201/ [https://perma.cc/ZZN7-EV2A]. 
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In any event, it is difficult to imagine a persuasive empirical study that 
compared the cultural effects of compensated kidney donation to those of 
professional violent sports, and none exists as far as we know. Our intuition is 
that a program of compensation for kidney donors would not degrade the culture, 
but rather affirm a cultural commitment to respond to disability and sustain life—
and that in any event it would be more positive than the effects of compensating 
the deliberate brutality of football and other violent sports. 
C. Cognitive Biases and Limitations 
The belief that adults are able to discern and act on their true interests when 
faced with complex choices is basic to JS Mill’s argument for freedom from 
government interference. During the last half-century, economists and 
behavioral scientists have explored the limitations and biases in decision making, 
demonstrating that even competent and sober adults tend to make systematic 
errors in decision-making.140 When the stakes are high, as they are in choosing to 
donate a kidney or play professional football, even a free-choice advocate may 
accept that some limits are warranted. If NOTA were amended to allow 
payments to donors, potential kidney donors could be protected against being 
unduly tempted through the existing structure of screening, counseling, and 
delay. On the other hand, it is not clear that NFL recruits have such protections 
in place. 
Ideally, a rational person faced with an important decision (donate a kidney, 
sign a contract to play professional football) would want to proceed as a decision 
analyst would instruct.141 The goal is to combine the objective consequences of 
the option with the individual’s subjective valuation of these consequences, 
including timing (now versus later) and likelihood: 
• List all possible consequences over the life course 
• Estimate the probability of each consequence 
• Assess the utility gain or loss of each consequence according to the 
decision maker’s own preferences 
• Calculate whether the expected value in terms of utility gains and 
losses is positive.142 
Needless to say, that is not how such decisions are made in practice, although 
in the case of kidney donation (and not football) much of the relevant 
information will at least be provided as part of the counseling required of 
 
 140.  See generally KAHNEMANN, supra note 133 (describing the thinking processes of adults); Beard 
& Leitzel, supra note 129, at 266 (describing kidney donation in Kahnemann’s terms); Thomas R. Beard 
& James A. Leitzel, Compensated Live Kidney Donations (June 17, 2015) (unpublished draft), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2619934 [https://perma.cc/6S67-H5ZQ] (arguing 
that safeguards can protect donors from the dangers of a compensation system for live kidney donations).  
 141.  See generally ROBERT D. BEHN & JAMES W. VAUPEL, QUICK ANALYSIS FOR BUSY 
DECISIONMAKERS (1983) (laying out a process for decision making); James W. Vaupel & Philip J. Cook, 
Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Self-Hazardous Behavior 15 (Duke University, Working Paper, 1978).  
 142.  Vaupel, supra note 141, at 15. 
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potential donors.143 The difficulty of making an informed decision is greater 
because the decider can only go down that path once. 
Research in behavioral science has documented the tendency of adults to 
make systematic errors in their decisions. Much of this research has focused on 
choices that have uncertain outcomes, outcomes that are distributed over time, 
or require the decision maker to predict her sense of well-being under the 
scenarios implied by the available choices.144 For example, although people tend 
to discount the value of delayed consequences according to how far in the future 
they would be experienced, they can make sensible choices between prospects 
that offer a payoff in one year or larger payoff in two years. However, prospects 
with immediate payoffs are often tempting out of proportion to their objective 
value and induce impulsive choices that are later regretted.145 The difficulty of 
self-regulation is well reflected in the famous “marshmallow” test in delayed 
gratification.146 Thus, the issue is not whether individuals should be trusted to act 
like well-informed decision analysts, but whether they could benefit from legal 
restrictions on the menu of possibilities available to them. 
It is helpful to deconstruct the decision to donate a kidney under both the 
current regime (no compensation) and a hypothetical regime (in which the donor 
would be financially compensated). Living donation is an arduous process that 
would not be undertaken by the average well-informed person without a 
substantial reward of some sort (whether monetary or emotional). Under the 
current regime, only about 6,000 living donors volunteer each year. Almost all of 
these donors specify who is to receive their kidney, and as a consequence the 
donor has the satisfaction of saving the life of a family member or friend, and 
presumably enjoys their gratitude as well.147 Potential donors undergo screening, 
both medical and psychological.148 Although donors do not have to pay the 
expense of the screening and operation, they may have lost earnings at the time 
that are not reimbursed. If they experience medical consequences years later no 
financial help will be forthcoming from the beneficiaries of their gift, or the 
kidney-donation system. 
Everything about this process leans against making an impulsive decision to 
donate. Indeed, those who choose to become a donor may typically see it as an 
obligation rather than an opportunity. They may be under pressure by family 
 
 143.  Devasmita Choudhury et al., Independent Donor Ethical Assessment: Aiming to Standardize 
Donor Advocacy, 24 PROGRESS TRANSPLANTATION, no. 2, 2014, at 1, 1 (transplant centers have 
independent donor advocates or advocacy teams, charged with ensuring that donors are well informed 
at the time they consent). 
 144.  David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q. J. ECON.  443, 445–46 (1997). 
 145.  See generally Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, 
40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 351, 353 (2002) (explaining how time affects decisionmaking).   
 146.  Walter Mischel et al., Cognitive and Attentional Mechanisms in Delay of Gratification, 21 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 204, 204 (1972). 
 147.  Cook & Krawiec, supra note 9, at 21. 
 148.  Id.  
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members or may not see any acceptable alternative to the unpleasant prospect of 
donating. There is no temptation in this scenario, given the delays, the counseling, 
and the fact that much of the pain and risk precede the usually rewarding event 
of donation. 
If the system for screening potential donors were preserved, but now with the 
possibility of compensation (for the sake of argument, worth $50,000) then many 
more donors would likely come forward, especially for non-directed donations. 
For the additional donors, the payment would be a stronger incentive than the 
psychic rewards of a pure altruistic act. (In fact, in this regime some would-be 
family donors may decide to refrain, given the knowledge that other suitable 
kidneys are available.) The increase in donations would save many lives and 
reduce costs to taxpayers. But the question remains of whether the promise of 
payment would tend to encourage donations that are not in the donors’ true 
interest, as a decision analyst would define that interest. 
For the potential donor, the prospect of financial reward may overcome 
concerns about the temporary pain and disability, not to mention the slight risk 
of death, stemming from the operation, as well as the small probability of medical 
problems years or decades later. There is nothing intrinsically irrational about a 
willingness to assume medical risk in exchange for a substantial amount of 
money. But the quality of the choice may be influenced by the sequence of events. 
If donors were offered a $50,000 check on the day that they volunteered to donate 
but did not have to actually go on the operating table for a year, impulsive ill-
considered donations might be the norm. But the disproportionate temptation of 
an immediate payoff could be managed if the payment were not made until after 
the operation. In the normal course of events, payoff would be put off for weeks 
or even months while the donor underwent screening and matching.149 
The delayed payoff would have the effect of protecting potential donors 
against impulsive decisions while respecting their underlying preferences for the 
value of the money vis-à-vis the medical risks of donation. The delay is in the 
spirit of the “nudge” approach to policy design popularized by Richard H. Thaler 
and Cass Sunstein.150 It contrasts with the paternalistic approach, which 
effectively denies the validity of the donor’s preferences. A recent survey, for 
example, found a sizable group that thought it was unacceptable to offer potential 
subjects in a risky medical experiment as much as $10,000.151 The authors 
speculated that these respondents thought that a large payoff would induce 
people to participate who placed too much value on money (or too little on their 
 
 149.  To further ensure that donors’ decisions were made in prudent fashion, the payment could be 
made in kind, in the form, for example, of lifetime disability and medical insurance policies. Of course, 
that form of compensation may mute the supply response simply because it would be less alluring.  
 150.  See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (presenting the libertarian paternalism thesis and 
recommendations for choice architecture). 
 151.  Sandro Ambuehl et al., More Money, More Problems? Can High Pay Be Coercive and 
Repugnant?, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 357, 358 (2015). 
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health).152 
The same concerns that apply to the quality of kidney donor decisions also 
apply, and more obviously, to the decision to sign a contract to play in the NFL. 
Players are provided with little information about the risks. Although, the longer-
term risks (including the risk of CTE in middle age) have not been well 
quantified, they appear to be far higher than for kidney donation. The payoff in 
both financial terms and status is also very high, and in part conveyed 
immediately. Any counseling or screening that might occur is up to the player to 
pursue. 
D. Exploitation, Coercion, Race & Class 
Living kidney donors in the United States have above-average incomes (after 
adjusting for sex and age),153 perhaps because potential donors with lower 
incomes cannot afford to miss work.154 In a new regime in which donors were paid 
a substantial fee, it is predictable that the influx of volunteers would have below-
average incomes. The prospect of financially stressed individuals attempting to 
make ends meet by “selling” a kidney raises a red flag for some ethicists.155 A 
compensation regime would expand the choice set for those in comfortable 
circumstances, but those in desperate circumstances might feel compelled to sell 
a kidney; in that sense, the option of selling could be seen as coercive. 
Furthermore, a system that in part depends on the poor to supply kidneys could 
be seen as exploiting the poor. This line of thought is represented in a 2001 report 
of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission in a related circumstance, paid 
participation in medical experiments: “benefits threaten . . . the voluntary nature 
of the choice, . . . raise the danger that the potential participant’s distributional 
disadvantage could be exploited [and] . . . lead some prospective participants to 
enroll . . . when it might be against their better judgment and when otherwise they 
would not do so.”156 
Using words like “coercion” and “exploitation” to characterize the 
introduction of a new option by which poor people (and others) could earn a 
substantial amount of money provides more heat than light on this situation. 
There is a legitimate ethical concern that so many Americans are poor, with 
inequality increasing over time. But that observation does not support a ban on 
compensation, which in fact limits the options available to the poor and thereby 
makes a bad situation (their lack of marketable assets) worse. But for anyone not 
persuaded by this argument, we note that these social-justice concerns have been 
 
 152.  Id. at 359. 
 153.  Jagbir Gill et al., The Effect of Race and Income on Living Kidney Donation in the United States, 
24 J. AM. SOC’Y NEPHROL. 1872, 1874 (2013). 
 154.  Rodrigue, supra note 5. 
 155.  Capron, supra note 129, at 47; Debra Satz, The Moral Limits of Markets: The Case of Human 
Kidneys, 108 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 269, 276 (2008). 
 156.  Ambuehl, supra note 151, at 357 (quoting NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, ETHICAL 
AND POLICY ISSUES IN RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS 90 (2001)). 
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raised with at least equal force to compensating boxers. One set of commentators, 
for example, lament that most boxers are 
from poor, working-class backgrounds.  Many are members of minority groups for 
whom boxing may seem to be one of the few ways out of the misery they were born into 
. . . an impoverished society (such as in many Latin American nations) or an 
economically depressed city (such as Detroit) is fertile ground for a flourishing boxing 
industry.157 
As more has become known about the dangers of repeated head trauma, 
similar arguments regarding football have become more prominent. About 70% 
of NFL players are black, and Pacific Islanders are also overrepresented as 
compared to the American population.158 Accordingly, much attention has been 
paid to the concussion crisis as a race and class problem. As one observer recently 
noted, “What’s a little permanent brain damage when you’re facing a life of 
debilitating poverty?”159 In reality, however, NFL players are better educated 
themselves, and come from better educated homes, than is average for 
Americans, in part because the NFL typically recruits college students. Still, some 
NFL players, like some would-be kidney donors, come from poverty. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Our claim is that there is a stronger case for compensating kidney donors than 
for compensating participants in violent sports. If this proposition is accepted, 
one implication is that there are only three logically consistent positions: allow 
compensation for both kidney donation and for violent sports; allow 
compensation for kidney donation but not for violent sports; or allow 
compensation for neither. Our current law and practice is perverse in endorsing 
a fourth regime, allowing compensation for violent sports but not kidney 
donation. 
A common argument in support of the ban on kidney donation is that if 
people were offered the temptation of substantial compensation, some would 
volunteer to donate against their own “true” best interests. This argument is 
often coupled with a social justice concern, namely that if kidney donors were 
 
 157.  MICHAEL A. MESSNER & DONALD F. SABO, SEX, VIOLENCE AND POWER IN SPORTS 77–78 
(1994) (quoted in David Gendall, The Sport of Boxing: Freedom versus Social Constraint, 5 WAIKATO L. 
REV. 71, 77 (1997)). We have found no systematic analysis of the socio-economic status of professional 
boxers. Certainly, there are many anecdotal reports of boxers fighting their way out of poverty and the 
argument is often made (though, as noted, without apparent empirical support) that boxers are 
disproportionately drawn from among the poor. See, e.g., Michael Gunn & David Ormerod, Despite The 
Law: Prize Fighting And Professional Boxing, in LAW AND SPORT IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 33–34 
(Steven Greenfield & Guy Osborn eds., 2000). 
 158.  NFL Census 2016, PROFOOTBALLLOGIC (Apr. 19, 2017), http://www.profootballlogic.com/ 
articles/nfl-census-2016 [https://perma.cc/B6TL-S9R9]. 
 159.  Mychal Denzel Smith, For Black Boys, The NFL – And Traumatic Brain Injury – Can Be Lottery 
Tickets, NATION (Jan. 28, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/black-boys-nfl-and-traumatic-brain-
injury-can-be-lottery-tickets/ [https://perma.cc/ZXA4-RXFS]. 
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paid, a large percentage of volunteers would be poor and financially stressed, and 
for them the offer of a substantial financial inducement would be coercive. In 
sum, a system of compensated donation would provide an undue temptation and 
end up exploiting the poor. 
To these arguments we offer both a direct response, and a response by 
analogy with violent sport. A fundamental norm of our culture and legal tradition 
is to respect the choices of (sober, competent, well informed, adult) individuals. 
That norm serves to limit government interference with private choices. It is 
supported by the right to liberty from undue government interference. A well-
developed organ procurement process in the American system seeks to ensure 
that potential donors are fully capable of making a good decision. Potential 
kidney donors are not only provided with full information, but also screened for 
mental and physical disability. Although there is the possibility of “mistakes” (a 
decision to donate against the true best interests of the individual) under a 
compensated system, the screening, consent process, and delays should minimize 
the chance for the kind of errors that behavioral economics has demonstrated are 
common. Under such circumstances, the opportunity to be paid for donating a 
kidney is not exploitative or coercive, but rather welfare-enhancing. 
We also argue by analogy with professional football, boxing, and other legal 
but violent sports. The medical risks to a professional career in violent sports are 
much greater both in the near and long term than the risks of donating a kidney. 
On the other hand, the consent and screening process in professional sports is not 
as developed as in kidney donation. Social justice concerns stem from the fact 
that most players are black and some come from impoverished backgrounds. In 
sum, the arguments against compensating kidney donors apply with equal or 
greater force to compensating athletes in these sports. 
Note that these arguments focus on the donors’ welfare and ignore the 
welfare of people in need of a kidney. A comprehensive evaluation of amending 
NOTA to allow compensation requires that both groups be considered. Such an 
evaluation, conducted by PJ Held and colleagues, reached the following 
conclusion about a regime in which the government would pay living donors 
enough ($45,000) to end the kidney shortage, thus saving much of the cost of 
dialysis that is currently borne by Medicare: 
From the viewpoint of society, the net benefit from saving thousands of lives each year 
and reducing the suffering of 100,000 more receiving dialysis would be about $46 billion 
per year, with the benefits exceeding the costs by a factor of 3. In addition, it would save 
taxpayers about $12 billion each year.160 
The present value of this total flow of social benefits would exceed $1,300 
billion.161 
 
 160.  Held, supra note 11, at 877. 
 161.  This is a conservative estimate, since it assumes that the net benefit would remain constant over 
time, and that the appropriate social discount rate is 3.5%. See Mark A. Moore et al., The Choice of the 
Social Discount Rate and the Opportunity Cost of Public Funds, 4 J. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 301, 402 
(2013).  
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As far as we know, there has been no cost-benefit analysis of the analogous 
reform in football, namely to ban professional compensation. But a first cut is the 
market value of NFL teams, since that value reflects the present value of future 
ticket sales and broadcast payments, net of costs, under the current legal regime. 
Presumably a ban on compensation would end professional football and drive 
the value of the thirty-two current teams to zero. That value, according to Forbes 
Magazine, is currently about $56 billion.162 That amount should be reduced to 
take account of subsidies by host cities, and expanded to take account of 
consumer surplus. Without actually doing that refined calculation, it is clear that 
the monetized value of allowing compensation for professional football players 
is far less than for allowing compensation for kidney donors. 
 
 
 162.  FORBES, SPORTS MONEY: 2017 NFL VALUATIONS, https://www.forbes.com/forbes/welcome/ 
?toURL=https://www.forbes.com/nfl-valuations/&refURL=https://www.google.com/&referrer= 
https://www.google.com/ [https://perma.cc/2EQ7-6WAY] (last visited Jan. 23, 2018). 
